































































- FUDENBERG, D., AND D. LEVINE (1989): "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," *Econometrica*, 57, 759–778.
- GALE, D., AND M. HELLWIG (1985): "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," *Review of Economic Studies*, 52, 647–663.
- GREEN, P., AND M. PORTER (1984): "Non-Cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," *Econometrica*, 32, 87–100.
- GROSSMAN, S., AND O. HART (1983): "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," *Econometrica*, 51, 7–45.
- KHALIL, F. (1992): "Commitment in Auditing," Mimeo, University of Washington.
- LAFFONT, J.-J., AND J. TIROLE (1986): "Using Cost Observations to Regulate Firms," *Journal of Political Economy*, 94, 614–641.
- (1990): "Cost Padding, Auditing and Collusion," Working Paper 572, MIT.
- MANGOLD, N. R. (1988): *Changing Auditors and the Effect on Earnings, Auditors' Opinions, and Stock Prices*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Research Press.
- MASKIN, E., AND J. RILEY (1984): "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," *Rand Journal of Economics*, 15, 171–196.
- POLINSKY, A. M., AND S. SHAVELL (1984): "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment," *Journal of Public Economics*, 24, 89–99.
- SAPPINGTON, D. (1983): "Limited Liability Contracts Between Principal and Agent," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 29, 1–21.
- SIMON, H. (1954): *Centralization versus Decentralization in the Controller's Department*, Controllership Foundation.
- TIROLE, J. (1986): "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," *Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations*, 2, 181–214.
- (1990): "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations," Mimeo, M.I.T.
- THEROUX, R., AND J. UMBECK (1987): "Drunken Driving, Hit-and-Runs, and Bribery," *Regulation*, 2, 44–47.
- WILLIAMSON, O. (1985): *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism*. New York: Free Press.